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Program: Is It 
Cost Effective?
by Arnold W . Reitze Jr .
Arnold W . Reitze Jr . is a Professor of Law at the S .J . 
Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah 
and a member of the Utah Air Quality Board .
Summary
Under the Clean Air Act, state-run vehicle inspec-
tion and maintenance (I/M) programs aim at pre-
venting both manufacturers and consumers from 
circumventing or tampering with emissions control 
technology . Recent manufacturer cheating scandals, 
however, were detected by means other than I/M pro-
grams, and much I/M enforcement has been targeted 
at relatively low-level offenses . This Article traces the 
evolution of the I/M program and examines whether 
it currently provides benefits greater than its costs to 
vehicle owners, using Utah’s Wasatch Front (which 
includes Salt Lake City) to illustrate how the program 
operates in practice . It concludes that there is little 
current information to support or reject the efficacy 
of the I/M program, and that a fresh look is war-
ranted to improve its effectiveness .
For nearly half a century, the Clean Air Act (CAA) has included a program to require new motor vehicles to meet federal emission standards .1 The federal govern-
ment preempts the regulation of new motor vehicle emis-
sions, but states regulate vehicle emissions after title passes 
to the consumer . This often includes an inspection and 
maintenance (I/M) program . The I/M program expanded 
significantly after 1977 because of the need for more strin-
gent controls on emission sources in areas that were not 
achieving air quality goals .
I/M is used to assure that vehicles continue to meet 
applicable emission standards after title passes to a con-
sumer . In addition, I/M was needed because both the 
automotive industry and vehicle owners were motivated to 
circumvent the emissions control technology used to meet 
federal motor vehicle emissions standards . Both manufac-
turers and consumers were tampering with or removing air 
pollution control devices .
Over the years, the CAA and its implementing regula-
tions evolved to further reduce motor vehicle emissions, 
which has included strengthening the I/M program . This 
has resulted in the development of vehicles with more 
effective and more complex emission control technology . 
The I/M program also evolved to produce a more sophis-
ticated inspection process . However, the I/M program has 
failed to be an effective tool for preventing manufacturers 
from cheating on the CAA’s motor vehicle emission con-
trol requirements .2
This Article traces the evolution of the I/M program 
and examines whether the current I/M program provides 
benefits greater than its costs in terms of both money and 
time to vehicle owners . Because the I/M program is imple-
mented by state and local governments, Utah’s Wasatch 
Front is used to illustrate how the program operates . Salt 
Lake City, located in Wasatch Front, is ranked by the 
American Lung Association as the seventh most-polluted 
U .S . city for short-term particulate pollution .3
1 . 42 U .S .C . §7521; ELR Stat . CAA §202 .
2 . See Arnold W . Reitze Jr ., The Volkswagen Air Pollution Emissions Litigation, 
46 ELR 10564 (2016) .
3 . Press Release, American Lung Association, “State of the Air” Report Finds 
Continued Improvement in Air Quality, Yet Increase in Life-Threatening 
Spikes of Particle Pollution (Apr . 19 . 2017) .
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I. History of the I/M Program
The Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act of 1965 
authorized federal regulation of automotive emissions .4 
In 1966, the U .S . Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare established federal emission standards that first 
applied to model year (MY) 1968 vehicles . Subsequently, 
the Air Quality Act of 19675 provided for federal preemp-
tion of new motor vehicle emissions controls, although 
California was eligible for a waiver so that it could set more-
stringent standards .6 It also established a program that pro-
vided grants for states to use to develop vehicle inspection 
programs .7 An important feature of the 1967 Act was its 
provision that it did not “preclude or deny to any State or 
political subdivision thereof the right otherwise to control, 
regulate, or restrict the use, operation, or movement of reg-
istered or licensed motor vehicles .”8
The CAA Amendments of 1970 gave the Administra-
tor of the recently created U .S . Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) expanded authority to prescribe emission 
standards for new motor vehicles, but continued the 1967 
authority for states to regulate motor vehicle emissions 
after the initial registration .9 Although the states could 
have developed I/M programs, few did .10 It was not until 
the enactment of the 1977 CAA Amendments that I/M 
became a required program for many states .11 The CAA 
Amendments of 1977 established December 31, 1982, as 
the deadline for states to meet national ambient air qual-
ity standards (NAAQS) .12 The deadline could be extended 
until December 31, 1987, for violators of the carbon mon-
oxide (CO) or ozone (O3) NAAQS if specified emission 
control measures were adopted .13 This included a mandate 
to establish an I/M program in nonattainment areas .14
EPA issued an I/M policy guidance document in 1978, 
but it never issued binding regulations .15 This resulted in 
considerable variation in state programs . The I/M program 
was resisted by most states, and EPA was slow to sanc-
tion states that failed to meet the I/M requirements .16 To 
4 . Pub . L . No . 89-272, 79 Stat . 992 .
5 . Pub . L . No . 90-148, §§103-104, 81 Stat . 485, 486-88 .
6 . Id . §208 (CAA §209, 42 U .S .C . §7543(a)); see also City of Chicago 
v . General Motors Corp ., 467 F .2d 1262, 1264, 2 ELR 20636 (7th Cir . 
1972) (holding that the Air Quality Act of 1967 “explicitly provided for 
preemption”); see generally David P . Currie, Motor Vehicle Air Pollution: State 
Authority and Federal Preemption, 68 Mich . L . Rev . 1083, 1090 (1970) .
7 . Pub . L . No . 90-148, §§104, 210, and 209 .
8 . Id . §208(c) .
9 . Pub . L . No . 91-604, §§202 & 209(c) .
10 . Prior to 1974, I/M programs were in operation in New York (for taxi 
cabs); Chicago, Illinois; Riverside, California; Cincinnati, Norwood, and 
Hamilton County, Ohio; Portland, Oregon; and Phoenix and Tucson, 
Arizona . National Academy of Sciences, Report by the Committee 
on Motor Vehicle Emissions 132-33 (1974) .
11 . CAA §§110(a)(2)(G), 172(a)(2)(C), 42 U .S .C . §§7410(a)(2)(G), 7502(a)
(2)(C) .
12 . Pub . L . No . 95-95, §129, 91 Stat . 685 (codified at 42 U .S .C . §7502) .
13 . CAA §§110(a)(2)(G), 172, 42 U .S .C . §§7410(a)(2)(G), 7502 .
14 . CAA §172(b)(11)(B), 42 U .S .C . §7502(b)(11)(B) .
15 . Inspection/Maintenance Program Requirement, 57 Fed . Reg . 52950, 
52952 (Nov . 5, 1992) .
16 . See Arnold W . Reitze Jr . & Barry Needleman, Control of Air Pollution From 
Mobile Sources Through Inspection and Maintenance Programs, 30 Harv . J . 
on Legis . 409 (1993) .
obtain the cooperation of the states, EPA approved emis-
sion reduction credits for I/M programs that helped states 
obtain the emissions reductions for CO and O3 that are 
needed to obtain EPA’s approval of a state implementation 
plan (SIP) .17 EPA also provided grants to appropriate state 
agencies in amounts up to two-thirds of the cost of devel-
oping an I/M program .18
The 1977 I/M programs were only partially effective, 
for several reasons . First, vehicle emissions were tested 
when the engine was idling and at high idle (2,500 revolu-
tions per minute), but not at the engine speed of a vehicle 
operating at highway speed . The idle mode test is easy 
to perform and requires minimal technical training . To 
pass this test, hydrocarbon (HC) and CO emissions must 
meet EPA’s standards for the vehicle’s MY .19 Second, vehi-
cles were visually inspected for tampering, but the most 
common tampering involved using less-expensive leaded 
gasoline .20 The use of leaded gasoline destroys the effective-
ness of the catalytic converter, which results in increased 
emissions, but the I/M test may not detect this tamper-
ing .21 Eventually, the CAA prohibited lead additives in 
gasoline .22 Finally, another weakness of the I/M program 
is that failed vehicles may not be repaired if the repair cost 
exceeds the regulatory cap that limits the cost imposed by 
the I/M program .23
The 1990 CAA Amendments imposed many new 
requirements on states with nonattainment areas .24 
Ozone nonattainment areas were classified into five 
categories (marginal, moderate, serious, severe, or 
extreme) based on the severity of the nonattainment 
problem .25 New requirements were placed on marginal 
areas, with additional requirements for areas with lower 
air quality classifications .26
Ozone nonattainment areas are required to at least 
have a basic I/M program .27 Urbanized “serious” or worse 
nonattainment areas with a 1980 population of 200,000 
or more must have an enhanced I/M program .28 States 
within the O3 transport region, which includes 11 north-
eastern states and the District of Columbia, must have 
enhanced I/M programs for their metropolitan statisti-
cal areas or areas with a 1990 population of 100,000 or 
more regardless of the area’s classification .29 CO nonat-
tainment areas are divided into moderate and serious 
categories .30 Moderate areas are required to have a basic 
17 . Id . at 418 .
18 . CAA §110, 42 U .S .C . §7410 .
19 . CAA §202(g), 42 U .S .C . §7521(g) .
20 . See generally Arnold W . Reitze Jr ., Controlling Automotive Air Pollution 
Through Inspection and Maintenance Programs, 47 Geo . Wash . L . Rev . 705 
(1979) .
21 . See generally Arnold W . Reitze Jr ., The Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives 
Under Section 211 of the Clean Air Act, 29 Tulsa L .J . 485 (1994) .
22 . CAA §211(g) & (k), 42 U .S .C . §7544(g) & (k) .
23 . 40 C .F .R . §51 .380(a)(6) & (7) (2017) .
24 . Pub . L . No . 101-549, 104 Stat . 2399 .
25 . CAA §181, 42 U .S .C . §7511 .
26 . CAA §182, 42 U .S .C . §7511a .
27 . CAA §182(a)(2)(B), 42 U .S .C . §7511a(a)(2)(B) .
28 . CAA §182(c)(3), 42 U .S .C . §7511a(c)(3) .
29 . CAA §184, 42 U .S .C . §7511c .
30 . CAA §186(a)(1), 42 U .S .C . §7512(a)(1) .
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I/M program, but nonattainment areas with an air qual-
ity design value greater than 12 .7 parts per million at the 
time of classification are required to have an enhanced 
I/M program .31 In August 1990, 96 urban areas were in 
violation of NAAQS for O3 and 41 areas could not attain 
the CO standard .32
In response to the 1990 CAA Amendments, EPA 
upgraded the basic I/M requirements to provide new mini-
mum standards concerning inspection frequency and test 
methods, as well as other improvements to the quality of 
the measurements .33 The upgraded I/M program is similar 
to the 1977 program, but is based on updated information, 
and the emission reduction benefits are estimated using 
the current version of EPA’s mobile source emission mod-
el .34 An idle test is used to determine whether a vehicle’s 
exhaust emissions meet standards specified in 40 C .F .R . 
Part 85, Subpart W .35 Nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions 
must not increase because of steps taken to meet HC and 
CO requirements unless it is shown that NOx reductions 
will not improve air quality in the O3 nonattainment area .
36 
For MY 2001 and later, the basic program requires light-
duty vehicles (LDVs) with an on-board diagnostic (OBD) 
system to be inspected, and any malfunctions identified 
by the system must be repaired .37 EPA estimates that 60% 
of the total tailpipe HC emissions from LDVs are caused 
by 20% of the vehicles that have serious emission control 
system malfunctions or degradation .38
The states with serious or worse O3 nonattainment 
areas were required to submit an enhanced I/M program 
by November 15, 1992 .39 The statute specifies the seven 
elements required for an enhanced I/M program: (1) the 
use of computerized emission analyzers, including on-
road testing devices; (2) no waivers for vehicles or parts 
covered by performance warranties, with limited excep-
tions; (3)  the maximum repair costs a vehicle owner is 
required to expend must be increased to $450 for repairs, 
adjusted annually based on the consumer price index; 
(4)  enforcement through denial of vehicle registration, 
unless the state can demonstrate a more-effective enforce-
ment program; (5)  annual inspections, unless the state 
shows biennial inspections are as effective; (6) a central-
ized program, unless the state can demonstrate a decen-
tralized program is as effective; and (7)  a program for 
inspection of emission control diagnostic systems and the 
repair of identified malfunctions .40
31 . CAA §187(a)(4) & (6), 42 U .S .C . §7512(a)(4) & (6) . The design value is 
the second highest eight-hour CO value evaluated over a two-year period .
32 . Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle 
Engines; Regulations Requiring On-Board Diagnostic Systems on 1994 and 
Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicles and Light-Duty Trucks, 56 Fed . Reg . 
48272, 48273 (proposed Sept . 24, 1991) .
33 . 40 C .F .R . §§51 .352- .358 (2017) .
34 . Id . §51 .352(a) (2016) .
35 . Id .
36 . Id . §51 .352(b) (2016) .
37 . Id . §51 .352(c) (2016) .
38 . Id .
39 . Id .
40 . CAA §182(c)(3)(C), 42 U .S .C . §7511a(c)(3)(C) .
EPA promulgated more-specific requirements for the 
enhanced I/M program in its regulations,41 including NOx 
and volatile organic compound (VOC) performance stan-
dards in O3 nonattainment areas .
42 The standards are based 
on the MY of the vehicle .43 Enhanced I/M requires test-
ing under load during cycles of acceleration and decelera-
tion, which is called the transient loaded, high-tech, or I/
M240 exhaust test .44 Because it simulates actual driving 
conditions, the loaded mode test provides a better indica-
tion of actual emissions than does the idle mode test . The 
regulations also require monitoring the effectiveness of the 
vapor recovery and recirculation mechanisms installed on 
vehicles built after 1971 using an evaporative system integ-
rity test (pressure test) and an evaporative performance test 
(purge test) .45 Enhanced I/M also requires the OBD sys-
tem to be inspected and malfunctions repaired .46 States are 
required to deny motor vehicle registration if a vehicle fails 
the enhanced I/M test .47 However, an alternative enforce-
ment mechanism may be used by a state if it is more effec-
tive than registration denial .48
Following enactment of the 1990 CAA Amendments, 
there was considerable resistance to implementing the 
I/M program by some states .49 A significant controversy 
involved EPA’s insistence on the adoption of centralized 
I/M programs that were required by the statute unless the 
state demonstrated a decentralized program was equally 
effective .50 A centralized enhanced I/M program was 
unpopular with most states because it forced vehicle own-
ers to search for a limited number of centralized testing 
facilities . In addition, if testing and repairs could not be 
completed at the same facility, vehicle owners could be sub-
ject to a “ping-pong effect” by being forced to travel from a 
testing facility to a separate repair station and then return 
to the testing facility to ensure that the repairs corrected 
the emissions control problems .51 Moreover, a centralized 
system forced existing test stations to discontinue testing, 
which resulted in their loss of testing revenue as well as the 
income generated by related repair work .52
In November 1994, the mid-term national elections 
created a Republican majority in Congress,53 which led 
to EPA proposing a rule to allow the states to have more 
41 . Inspection and Maintenance Program Requirements, 57 Fed . Reg . 31050 
(1992) (codified at 40 C .F .R . §51 .351) .
42 . 40 C .F .R . §51 .351(f ) (2016) .
43 . Id . §51 .351(f )(7) .
44 . Id . §51 .351(f )(6) .
45 . Id . §51 .357(b)(3) .
46 . Id . §51 .351(c) (2016) .
47 . Id . §51 .361 .
48 . Id .
49 . See generally Arnold W . Reitze Jr ., Federalism and the Inspection and 
Maintenance Program Under the Clean Air Act, 27 Pac . L .J . 1461, 1500 
(1996) [hereinafter Federalism and the Inspection and Maintenance Program] .
50 . CAA §182(c)(3)(C)(vi); 42 U .S .C . §7511a(c)(3)(C)(vi) .
51 . Federalism and the Inspection and Maintenance Program, supra note 49, at 
1502 .
52 . Id .
53 . See Arnold W . Reitze Jr ., Air Quality Protection Using State Implementation 
Plans—Thirty-Seven Years of Increasing Complexity, 15 Vill . Envtl . L .J . 
209, 272 (2004); Federalism and the Inspection and Maintenance Program, 
supra note 49, at 1511 .
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flexibility in addressing the I/M program requirements .54 
A rule change was finalized on September 18, 1995,55 
which addressed many of the concerns of the states 
administering the enhanced I/M program .56 Among the 
provisions of the flexibility rule was a change in the fre-
quency of testing, allowing it to be done every other year . 
In addition, there was a provision allowing the required 
testing to be performed at a decentralized test-and-repair 
facility even though EPA continued to believe central-
ized inspections were more effective .57 A 50% reduction 
in emissions credits was imposed on states using the 
combined test-and-repair facilities, despite heavy opposi-
tion to this penalty .58 The 1995 flexibility rule also cre-
ated a low enhanced I/M performance standard, which 
was easier to perform and less costly than the enhanced 
I/M performance standard that was required in more 
seriously polluted areas .59
The conflict between EPA and the states was addressed 
on November 28, 1995, when President Bill Clinton signed 
into law the National Highway System Designation Act .60 
Its §348 made two significant changes to the I/M pro-
gram . First, EPA:
shall not require adoption or implementation by a State 
of a test-only I/M240 enhanced vehicle inspection and 
maintenance program as a means of compliance with sec-
tion 182 or 187 of the Clean Air Act  .  .  . , but the Admin-
istrator may approve such a program if a State chooses to 
adopt the program .61
Second, the “Administrator shall not disapprove or apply 
an automatic discount to a state implementation plan revi-
sion  .  .  . because  .  .  . such plan revision is a decentralized 
or a test-and-repair program .”62 Finally, EPA is to grant full 
interim approval to plans that show “a good-faith effort” to 
meet CAA requirements .63
On January 9, 1998, EPA removed the requirement that 
states use I/M240 technology, which allowed less-expen-
sive testing technology to be used .64 EPA eventually suc-
cumbed to state pressure and allowed decentralized I/M 
programs to continue, and local testing by private facilities 
became the norm throughout most of the country .65 States 
gradually accepted the I/M mandate because of the need to 
54 . U .S . EPA, Inspection/Maintenance Flexibility Amendments, 60 Fed . Reg . 
20934 (proposed Apr . 28, 1995) .
55 . U .S . EPA, Inspection/Maintenance Flexibility Amendments, 60 Fed . Reg . 
48029 (Sept . 18, 1995) .
56 . 40 C .F .R . §51 .355(a) (2017) .
57 . 40 C .F .R . §51 .353 (2017) .
58 . See State Officials Not Pleased EPA’s Flexible Enhanced I/M Rule Still Does 
Not Address 50% Discount, 6 Clean Air Rep . (Inside EPA) 19:19 (Sept . 21, 
1995) .
59 . 40 C .F .R . §51 .351(g) (2016) .
60 . Pub . L . No . 104-59, 109 Stat . 568 .
61 . Id. at 616 .
62 . Id.
63 . Id.
64 . Minor Amendments to Inspection Maintenance Program Evaluation 
Requirements; Amendments to the Final Rule, 63 Fed . Reg . 1362 (Jan . 9, 
1998) (codified at 40 C .F .R . §51 .353(c)) .
65 . Federalism and the Inspection and Maintenance Program, supra note 49, at 
1514 .
develop SIP revisions for nonattainment areas that would 
satisfy EPA and avoid the onerous penalties for noncompli-
ance with SIP requirements .66
II. Testing Based on the Use of 
OBD Systems
Since 1981, manufacturers of automobiles have used on-
board computer systems to control engine operations . 
The early versions of the OBD system would detect a 
malfunction in the vehicle, and the malfunction indi-
cator light (MIL, or the check engine warning light) 
would illuminate .67
The 1990 CAA Amendments required an OBD system 
to be standard on all LDVs with a gross vehicle weight up 
to 8,500 pounds .68 Beginning with MY 1996 vehicles, 
improved technology, known as OBD Generation II, or 
OBD II, was used .69 It became subject to federally man-
dated I/M diagnostic checks beginning in 2002 .70 The 
statute directed EPA to promulgate regulations requiring 
manufacturers to install on all new LDVs and light-duty 
trucks (LDTs) diagnostic systems capable of the following:
(1) Accurately identifying emission-related system 
deterioration or malfunction, including, at a mini-
mum, the catalytic converter and oxygen sensor, 
which could cause or result in failure of the vehicle 
to comply with emission standards for the vehicle’s 
useful life,
(2) Alerting the vehicle’s owner or operator to the likely 
need for emission-related components or systems 
maintenance or repair,
(3) Storing and retrieving fault codes specified by the 
administrator, and
(4) Providing access to stored information in a manner 
specified by the administrator .71
In addition, §202(m) requires manufacturers to make 
available to interested persons all necessary emission-
related maintenance and repair information, including 
information needed to make use of the OBD II system .72 
Such information is to be provided according to regula-
tions adopted by EPA . After regulations were promulgated, 
the states had two years to modify their I/M programs to 
provide for inspection of OBD systems and for mainte-
nance or repair of malfunctions .73
66 . The most important sanction is EPA’s power to block transportation 
money from going to a noncompliant state . CAA §179(b)(1), 42 U .S .C . 
§7509(b)(1) .
67 . David Sosnowski & Edward Gardetto, U .S . EPA, Performing 
Onboard Diagnostic Checks as Part of a Vehicle Inspection and 
Maintenance Program 3, 5 (2001) (EPA 420-R-01-015) .
68 . CAA §202(m), 42 U .S .C . §7521(m) .
69 . OBD II, OBD-II Background, http://www .obdii .com/background .html 
(last visited Aug . 3, 2017) .
70 . 40 C .F .R . §51 .357(a)(12) (2002) .
71 . CAA §202(m)(1), 42 U .S .C . §7521(m)(1) .
72 . CAA §202(m)(5), 42 U .S .C . §7521(m)(5) .
73 . CAA §201(m)(3), 42 U .S .C . §7521(m)(3) .
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Under the 1990 CAA Amendments, states required to 
implement I/M programs were further required to incor-
porate an evaluation of the OBD computer as part of those 
programs . On November 5, 1992, EPA promulgated a final 
rule related to state air quality implementation plans for 
I/M programs .74 At the time the 1992 rule was published, 
certification regulations for OBD II had not been finalized, 
so EPA reserved space in the I/M rule to address OBD-I/M 
requirements at a later date .75 EPA reported that 31 of the 
33 state and local areas that require I/M tests incorporated 
the use of OBD technology into their I/M procedures .76
On February 19, 1993, EPA promulgated an updated 
final OBD II regulation .77 For LDVs and LDTs with gaso-
line engines, the rule requires that the OBD II system 
monitor the performance and detect malfunctions and 
deterioration of the catalyst and oxygen sensor and detect 
engine misfire .78 The OBD II system is required to detect 
the occurrence of a malfunction or deterioration of any 
other emission-related powertrain system or component 
that results in an exhaust emission increase greater than 
specified in the regulation .79 It must also detect the occur-
rence of any leakage or other malfunction of the vapor 
recovery or purge systems that result in evaporative emis-
sions exceeding specified limits .80 The information iden-
tifying the likely problem must be stored in the vehicle’s 
computer, and the MIL must be illuminated .81 There are 
separate requirements for vehicles with diesel engines .82
The rule also requires that the OBD II system moni-
tor and detect electrical failure or disconnection of any 
emission-related component that, either directly or 
indirectly, sends information to, or receives informa-
tion from, the vehicle’s on-board computer .83 If an elec-
trical disconnection occurs that prevents or limits the 
operation of the component, regardless of the emission 
effect, the MIL must be illuminated and a trouble code 
stored .84 The rule also contains anti-tampering provi-
sions to protect the on-board computer from tampering, 
and to make inspection of the OBD II system an effec-
tive enforcement measure during I/M testing .85 Because 
the U .S . Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
(D .C .) Circuit vacated part of the regulations dealing 
with tampering involving the OBD II systems certified 
74 . U .S . EPA, Inspection/Maintenance Program Requirements, 57 Fed . Reg . 
52950 (Nov . 5, 1992) .
75 . Id .
76 . U .S . EPA, On-Board Diagnostics (OBD): Status of State and Local (OBD) 
Inspection/Maintenance (I/M) Programs, https://www .epa .gov/state-and-
local-transportation/board-diagnostics-obd-status-state-and-local-obd (last 
updated Aug . 2, 2016).
77 . Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle 
Engines; Regulations Requiring On-Board Diagnostic Systems on 1994 and 
Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicles and Light-Duty Trucks, 58 Fed . Reg . 
9468 (Feb . 19, 1993) .
78 . Id . at 9471 .
79 . Id .
80 . Id .
81 . Id .
82 . Id .
83 . Id .
84 . Id . at 9472 .
85 . Id .
to California’s OBD II regulations, EPA modified its 
regulations on October 7, 1994 .86
On August 18, 1995, EPA proposed modifications to 
the requirements applicable to I/M inspections of the 
OBD II systems .87 On August 30, 1996, EPA promul-
gated a final rule revising the requirements associated 
with OBD II systems .88 This rulemaking promulgated 
appropriate revisions to federal OBD II regulations so 
that compliance with California’s revised OBD II require-
ments satisfies federal requirements .89 On September 20, 
2000, EPA proposed to allow states to use an analysis of 
the computerized OBD II systems in lieu of tailpipe tests 
and evaporative system purge and fill-neck pressure tests 
on MY 1996 or newer vehicles .90 The rule was finalized 
on April 5, 2001 .91
EPA’s regulations concerning OBD are found at 40 
C .F .R . §86 .1806-05 . They are largely based on Califor-
nia’s regulations .92 For MY 2017 and later vehicles, OBD 
requirements are found at 40 C .F .R . §86 .1806-17 . These 
regulations require the OBD II system to detect malfunc-
tions or deterioration of emission-related components or 
elements of design before such malfunctions or deteriora-
tion individually cause emission increases above thresh-
olds set by EPA .93 When a malfunction or deterioration is 
detected, the MIL will illuminate and a diagnostic trouble 
code (DTC) identifying the malfunction will be stored 
in the computer for later use by a repair technician .94 The 
OBD II system is more accurate than tailpipe emissions 
tests because it tests the vehicle under a variety of operating 
conditions as the vehicle is used .
The OBD II test begins with a preliminary inspection of 
tires and components to assure the vehicle is safe to test .95 
If safe, the MIL is checked to assure it is operable .96 Then, 
the information from the vehicle is entered into the emis-
sions analyzer, which evaluates the status of the OBD II 
system’s vehicle monitors .97 If the vehicle’s monitors are 
operating properly, the test will continue .98 If no DTCs are 
86 . Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle 
Engines: Regulations Requiring Tampering Prevention for On-Board 
Diagnostic Systems, 59 Fed . Reg . 51114 (Oct . 7, 1994) .
87 . Inspection/Maintenance Program Requirement—On-Board Diagnostic 
Checks, 60 Fed . Reg . 43092 (Aug . 18, 1995) .
88 . Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle 
Engines: Regulations Requiring On-Board Diagnostic (OBD) Systems—
Acceptance of Revised California OBD II Requirements, 61 Fed . Reg . 
45898 (Aug . 30, 1996) .
89 . Id .
90 . Amendments to Vehicle Inspection Maintenance Program Requirements 
Incorporating the Onboard Diagnostic Check, 65 Fed . Reg . 56844 
(proposed Sept . 20, 2000) .
91 . Amendments to Vehicle Inspection Maintenance Program Requirements 
Incorporating the Onboard Diagnostic Check, 66 Fed . Reg . 18156 (Apr . 5, 
2001) (codified at 40 C .F .R . pts . 51, 85) .
92 . Control of Air Pollution From Motor Vehicles: Tier 3 Motor Vehicle 
Emission and Fuel Standards, 79 Fed . Reg . 23688 (Apr . 28, 2014) .
93 . 40 C .F .R . §86 .1806-17(a)(8) (2015) .
94 . Id . §86 .1806-17(b)(1) .
95 . Id .
96 . Id .
97 . Id .
98 . Id .
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found, the vehicle will pass the OBD II test .99 The use of 
the OBD II system makes it difficult to quantify the pol-
lutants reduced from the I/M programs because the sys-
tem’s approach is based on early discovery of malfunctions 
to prevent emissions of pollutants .
III. The Role of I/M in Enforcement 
of the CAA
A. History of I/M Enforcement
The I/M program can be utilized to assist in implementing 
at least three programs concerning mobile source emission 
control . First, the I/M program can be used to assure the 
emission controls that were incorporated into the vehicle 
continue to function for the life of the vehicle, as speci-
fied in the CAA .100 I/M can be used to identify categories 
of vehicles that fail to conform to the applicable emission 
regulations, which can lead to EPA requiring the manufac-
turer to remedy the nonconformity .101 For example, heavy-
duty diesel-powered vehicles of MY 2007 and later have 
been subject to an enforceable program for testing in-use 
vehicles .102 However, there is little evidence that the I/M 
program has played a significant role in implementing 
these recall requirements .103
Second, the I/M program can function to catch manu-
facturers that use defeat devices to avoid complying with 
the CAA’s provision for motor vehicle emission stan-
dards .104 Section 203(a)(1) of the CAA prohibits the sale 
of vehicles that do not conform to the provisions of an 
approved certificate of conformity (COC) issued by EPA 
to manufacturers .105 Section 203(a)(3)(b) prohibits the use 
of components intended to defeat or bypass pollution con-
trols .106 Violators are subject to a maximum civil penalty of 
$37,500 per day, adjusted for inflation .107
The “knowing violation” provision found in CAA 
§113(c)(1) does not apply to mobile source violations . 
However, CAA §113(c)(2) provides for criminal fines and 
imprisonment for up to two years for false statements 
and certifications, which includes any person who know-
ingly “falsifies, tampers with, renders inaccurate, or fails 
to install any monitoring device or method required to 
be maintained or followed under this chapter .”108 More-
99 . Salt Lake County Health Department, Health Regulation #22, Vehicle 
Emissions Control Program, §4 .3 .6 and app . A .
100 . CAA §207, 42 U .S .C . §§207(a), 7541 . The useful life of a vehicle is defined 
at CAA §202(d), 42 U .S .C . §7521(d) .
101 . CAA §207(c), 42 U .S .C . §7541(c) .
102 . Control of Emissions of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles: In-Use 
Testing for Heavy-Duty Diesel Engines and Vehicles, 70 Fed . Reg . 34594, 
34595 (June 14, 2005) .
103 . See generally U .S . EPA, 2012-2013 Progress Report Vehicle Engine 
Compliance Activities 24 (2015) (EPA-420-R-15-007) .
104 . CAA §202(a), 42 U .S .C . §7521(a) .
105 . 42 U .S .C . §7522(a)(1) .
106 . Id . §7522(a)(3)(b) & (a)(1) . Penalties are found at CAA §205(a), 42 U .S .C . 
§7424(a) .
107 . The statutory penalties after adjustment for inflation are found at 40 C .F .R . 
§19 .4, tbl . 1 (2017) .
108 . CAA §113(c)(2)(C), 42 U .S .C . §7413(c)(2)(C) .
over, CAA §203(a)(3)(B) makes it a violation to sell any 
part or component of a motor vehicle intended to “bypass, 
defeat, or render inoperative any device” installed to com-
ply with CAA regulations .109 The criminal enforcement 
provisions of CAA §113(c) appear to cover §203(a)(3)(B) 
violations . The criminal provisions found in Title 18 also 
may be used in cases involving CAA violations, which is 
discussed below .
Since the beginning of the federal program to control 
emissions from motor vehicles, numerous manufactur-
ers have schemed to avoid complying with the mobile 
source emission control requirements . Unfortunately, as 
discussed below, despite I/M programs, vehicle manufac-
turers often have been able to avoid detection of their vio-
lations, sometimes for years . Moreover, when violations 
are discovered, penalties, until recently, were not severe 
enough to discourage illegal behavior . Thus, I/M pro-
grams have played a minor role in preventing violations 
by the motor vehicle industry .
In 1973, EPA accused Volkswagen of selling MY 
1973 vehicles that used a temperature-sensing device 
to cut out pollution controls at low temperatures . Volk-
swagen settled for a fine of $120,000 without admitting 
any wrongdoing .110 In 1995, EPA and the U .S . Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) accused General Motors of using 
a computer chip that changed combustion parameters on 
470,000 Cadillac sedans that resulted in increased emis-
sions when the vehicles’ air conditioning and heating 
were being used .111 The federal test procedure (FTP) at 
that time did not include emissions testing when the air 
conditioning was operating .112 EPA alleged that the vehi-
cles were tampered with because emissions were higher 
during non-FTP operational conditions .113 On Novem-
ber 20, 1995, General Motors agreed to recall nearly 
500,000 late-model Cadillacs, pay an $11 million fine, 
and establish an “emission remedial project fund” of at 
least $7 .05 million to be used to replace older buses and 
fleet vehicles with less polluting vehicles .114 Compliance 
costs totaled about $45 million .115
In 1998, EPA settled with seven heavy-duty truck 
engine manufacturers that allegedly equipped their diesel 
engines with “defeat devices” by installing software that 
could detect when the engine was being tested under the 
FTP and then control the vehicle’s combustion process to 
produce legal emissions .116 When the engines were used on 
109 . 42 U .S .C . §7522(a)(3)(B) .
110 . Jeff Plungis, Carmaker Cheating on Emissions Almost as Old as Pollution Tests, 
46 Env’t Rep . (BNA) 2811 (Sept . 25, 2015) .
111 . John Cushman, Half-Million Cadillacs Recalled in Federal Pollution 
Settlement, N .Y . Times, Dec . 1, 1995 .
112 . Id .
113 . Id .
114 . See GM to Recall 470,000 Cadillacs, Pay Fine Over Charge That Device Raised 
Emissions, Daily Env’t Rep . (BNA), at AA-1 (Dec . 1, 1995) .
115 . Statement of Carol Browner, Administrator, U .S . EPA, DOJ/EPA Press 
Conference, Settlement, GM Enforcement Action (Nov . 20, 1995), 
available at 1995 WL 705249 .
116 . The seven manufacturers include: Caterpillar, Inc .; Cummins Engine 
Co .; Detroit Diesel Corp .; Mack Trucks, Inc .; Navistar International 
Transportation Corp .; Renault Vehicles Industrials, S .A .; and Volvo Truck 
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the road, the engine operation would change to be more 
fuel-efficient, but would produce up to three times the 
legal limit of NOx .
117 The companies paid a civil penalty 
of $83 .4 million to settle the case that led to about $1 bil-
lion in total costs to the companies .118 The manufacturers 
settled separately with the California Air Resources Board 
in 1998, agreeing to pay fines and fund programs to miti-
gate the NOx emissions that the nonconforming engines 
would generate in California .119
Also in 1998, Honda was alleged to have used emis-
sions defeat devices and paid a civil penalty of $12 .6 mil-
lion and incurred remedial costs of $250 million .120 Ford 
Motor Co . in the same year faced similar allegations and 
paid a civil penalty of $2 .2 million and incurred remedial 
costs estimated at $7 .5 million .121 In 2005, Volkswagen was 
accused of having defective emissions controls and paid a 
civil penalty of $1 .1 million and incurred costs of $27 .9 
million to fix the problem .122 Also in 2005, a similar claim 
was made against DaimlerChrysler Corp ., which paid a 
civil penalty of $1 million and incurred about $94 million 
in remedial costs .123 In 2006, Mercedes-Benz paid a civil 
penalty of $1 .2 million and incurred costs of $60 .2 million 
for vehicles with defective emissions controls .124
Corp . Press Release, DOJ, EPA Announce One Billion Dollar Settlement 
With Diesel Engine Industry for Clean Air Violations (Oct . 22, 1998), 
available at https://yosemite .epa .gov/opa/admpress .nsf/b1ab9f485b09897
2852562e7004dc686/93e9e651adeed6b7852566a60069ad2e?OpenDocu
ment .
117 . Steven A . Herman, Clean Air Act Settlement With Diesel Engine Makers 
Is Historic in Size, Scope, and Environmental Impact, 13 Nat’l Envtl . 
Enforcement J . 10:18 (1998) .
118 . Patrick Ambrosio, EPA Expected to Seek Significant Penalty Over Volkswagen’s 
Use of Defeat Devices, 46 Env’t Rep . (BNA) 2902 (Oct . 2, 2015) .
119 . United States v . Caterpillar, 227 F . Supp . 2d 73, 77, 33 ELR 20034 
(D .D .C . 2002); Carolyn Whetzel, State Regulators Criticize Slow Pace of 
Manufacturers’ Effort to Retrofit Diesels, 34 Env’t Rep . (BNA) 2778 (Dec . 19, 
2003) . Part of the settlement included a stipulation that the manufacturers 
would develop software to correct the problem and install it when engines 
are rebuilt or the vehicle owners request “reflashing” to reprogram a vehicle’s 
computer software . Many trucks, however, were not rebuilt and the 
Engine Manufacturers Association (EMA) litigated to avoid compliance . 
See Marivel De La Torre et al ., California Environmental 
Protection Agency, Air Resources Board, Report of Enforcement 
Activities: January 1-December 31, 2004, at 12 (2005) (noting that the 
“mandatory reflash program will be imposed”), http://www .arb .ca .gov/enf/
reports/04enfrpt .pdf . On Oct . 16, 2006, the Superior Court of California, 
County of Sacramento, ruled in favor of EMA, holding that California did 
not have statutory authority to require manufacturers to develop, provide, 
or install software, but the court held that the settlement agreement could 
be enforced . Court Rejection of California Engine Fix Rule May Deter Other 
States, 17 Clean Air Rep . (Inside EPA) 21:15 (Oct . 19, 2006) .
120 . Honda Settles Emissions Suit, CNNMoney, June 8, 1998, http://money .cnn .
com/1998/06/08/companies/honda/index .htm .
121 . Ambrosio, supra note 118, at 2904 .
122 . Press Release, U .S . EPA, Volkswagen of America, Inc ., Agrees to Pay More 
Than $1 Million for Clean Air Act Violation (June 15, 2005), available at 
https://yosemite .epa .gov/opa/admpress .nsf/b1ab9f485b098972852562e70
04dc686/6946eeaadcfa982b8525702100777c0e .
123 . Press Release, U .S . EPA, U .S . Announces $94 Million Clean Air Act 
Settlement With Chrysler Over Emission Control Defects on 1 .5 Million 
Jeep and Dodge Vehicles (Dec . 21, 2005), available at https://yosemite .epa .
gov/opa/admpress .nsf/68b5f2d54f3eefd28525701500517fbf/1751045d23
87854f852570de006ea56a!OpenDocument .
124 . Press Release, U .S . EPA, Mercedes-Benz Pays $1 .2 Million for Clean Air 
Act Violation, Also Spends $59 Million for Voluntary Recall (Dec . 21, 
2006), available at https://yosemite .epa .gov/opa/admpress .nsf/198a007cc
57e64d3852570210055f3f6/03fffa1d2e87aafc8525724b005e930b!Open
Document .
In 2014, Hyundai and Kia were accused of overstating 
the fuel economy of their vehicles .125 This led to a $100 mil-
lion civil penalty and at least $350 million in total costs .126 
On October 8, 2016, DOJ announced a settlement with 
Detroit Diesel Corp . concerning the company’s sale of 
7,786 heavy-duty diesel engines in 2010 that were not cer-
tified by EPA and did not meet the applicable CAA emis-
sion standards .127 The company settled the case by agreeing 
to spend $14 .5 million on projects to reduce emissions and 
to pay a $14 million civil penalty .128
B. The Volkswagen Case
Despite widespread efforts by motor vehicle manufac-
turers to use defeat devices to avoid complying with the 
CAA’s emissions requirements, the I/M program has not 
been an effective tool for detecting cheating . This has 
continued, as demonstrated by Volkswagen’s extensive 
cheating on its CAA obligations . On September 18, 2015, 
EPA announced that 482,000 Volkswagen diesel engine 
vehicles sold for many years in the United States were 
programmed to pass emissions tests, but when operated 
under normal driving conditions, they emitted air pollut-
ants well above the legal limit .129
This cheating was not discovered by EPA or by state-
run I/M programs .130 The International Council on 
Clean Transportation (ICCT), a European environmen-
tal group, wanted to have U .S . technology adopted for 
European motor vehicles because Volkswagen appeared to 
be meeting U .S . emission standards that were more strin-
gent than Europe’s .131 The ICCT funded West Virginia’s 
Center for Alternative Fuels, Engines, and Emissions 
(CAFEE) to study emissions from real-world driving of 
Volkswagen models .132 The CAFEE researchers concluded 
that the vehicles’ emissions were exceeding the CAA stan-
dards by five to 35 times .133 This resulted in investigations 
by EPA and California, and on September 3, 2015, Volk-
swagen admitted that it deliberately outfitted its cars with 
defeat devices .134
Volkswagen later announced about 11 million die-
sel vehicles were sold worldwide with diesel engines that 
125 . Press Release, U .S . EPA, United States Reaches Settlement With Hyundai 
and Kia in Historic Greenhouse Gas Enforcement Case (Nov . 3, 2014), 
available at https://archive .epa .gov/epapages/newsroom_archive/newsreleas
es/15519081fbf4002285257d8500477615 .html .
126 . Ambrosio, supra note 118, at 2903 .
127 . Press Release, DOJ, Detroit Diesel Corporation to Pay Penalty and Reduce 
Exposure to Harmful Diesel Exhaust to Resolve Clean Air Act Violations 
(Oct . 6, 2016) .
128 . Id .
129 . Volkswagen Official to Testify Before Congress, 46 Env’t Rep . (BNA) 3011 
(Oct . 9, 2015) .
130 . Charlotte Alter, The Man Who Brought Down Volkswagen, Time, Nov . 30/
Dec . 7, 2015, at 100 .
131 . Dune Lawrence et al ., How Could Volkswagen’s Top Engineers Not Have 
Known, Bloomberg Businessweek, Oct . 26/Nov . 1, 2015, at 52 .
132 . Alter, supra note 130 .
133 . Lawrence et al ., supra note 131, at 52 .
134 . Patrick Ambrosio, Volkswagen CEO Steps Down Amid Scandal Over 
Admissions of Pollution-Test Cheating, 46 Env’t Rep . (BNA) 2805 (Sept . 25, 
2015) .
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violate the law .135 Volkswagen inserted lines in the com-
puter code that controls engine performance to activate 
the emissions controls when driving patterns are con-
sistent with the testing protocol . But when the vehicle’s 
operation is consistent with normal road use, the engine is 
programmed to maximize fuel economy, which increases 
emissions dramatically .136
On January 4, 2016, DOJ filed a civil complaint against 
Volkswagen, Audi, and Porsche for violations involving 
about 500,000 two-liter diesel engine vehicles and about 
85,000 three-liter diesel engines .137 The complaint alleged 
violation of the CAA’s §203(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3)(A), and (a)
(3)(B) .138 In addition, many states, business interests, and 
individuals brought enforcement actions .139 In June 2016, 
EPA’s Administrator announced a proposed partial consent 
decree of its civil liability action for violations by 2009-
2015 two-liter diesel vehicles that include a vehicle buy-
back program, a NOx reduction program, and a program 
to advance the use of zero emissions vehicles (ZEVs) .140 It 
did not resolve the many private law suits, or the poten-
tial actions for CAA-based civil penalties or criminal pros-
ecutions .141 Volkswagen also installed defeat devices on 
its 2009-2016 vehicles with three-liter diesel engines . On 
July 13, 2016, the California Air Resources Board rejected 
Volkswagen’s proposed recall for about 85,000 three-liter 
diesel vehicles sold in the United States .142
135 . Arne Delfs et al ., Volkswagen Will Recall 8.5M Diesels After German Agency 
Takes Hard Line, 46 Env’t Rep . (BNA) 3076 (Oct . 16, 2015); Andrea 
Barbara Schuessler, Volkswagen Admits Europe Manipulations, Germany’s 
Transport Minister Reveals, 46 Env’t Rep . (BNA) 2809 (Sept . 25, 2015) .
136 . Lawrence et al ., supra note 131, at 52 .
137 . Press Release, DOJ, United States Files Complaint Against Volkswagen, 
Audi, and Porsche for Alleged Clean Air Act Violations (Jan . 4, 
2016), available at https://www .justice .gov/opa/pr/united-states-files-
complaint-against-volkswagen-audi-and-porsche-alleged-clean-air-act; 
Patrick Ambrosio, Federal Government Files Lawsuit Against Volkswagen Over 
Diesel Emissions Scandal, 47 Env’t Rep . (BNA) 97 (Jan . 8, 2016); Leslie 
Pappas, New Jersey Latest to Sue Volkswagen Alleging Consumer Fraud, Air 
Violations, 47 Env’t Rep . (BNA) 444 (Feb . 12, 2016) .
138 . Curt Barry, EPA Files Suit Over VW “Defeat Devices” Seeking “Significant” 
Penalties, 27 Clean Air Rep . (Inside EPA) 1:19 (Jan . 14, 2016) .
139 . By the end of October 2015, at least 80 consumer lawsuits had been filed in 
the United States on behalf of consumers that purchased or leased 482,000 
Volkswagen and Audi diesel vehicles . Jabeen Bhatti, Environmental Groups 
Worry VW Scandal May Cripple Green “Made in Germany” Reputation, 
46 Env’t Rep . (BNA) 3155 (Oct . 23, 2015) . The U .S . Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation transferred these consumer lawsuits to the U .S . 
District Court for the Northern District of California . On Feb . 22, 
2016, three class action lawsuits were filed against Volkswagen on behalf 
of (1)  consumers who purchased or leased affected Volkswagen vehicles; 
(2) automobile dealers who had affected diesel vehicles in their inventory on 
Sept . 18, 2015; and (3) automobile dealers that competed with Volkswagen 
that were disadvantaged by Volkswagen’s false marketing . Patrick Ambrosio, 
Plaintiffs File Three Class Action Complaints Over Volkswagen Diesel Emissions 
Cheating, 47 Env’t Rep . (BNA) 596 (Feb . 26, 2016); Margaret Cronin Fisk, 
V.W. Sued by U.S. Franchise Dealers for Losses Arising From Diesel Scandal, 47 
Env’t Rep . (BNA) 1031 (Apr . 8, 2016) .
140 . Patrick Ambrosio, “Ground-Breaking” VW Settlement Would Require as Much 
as $14.7 Billion, 47 Env’t Rep . (BNA) 1973 (July 1, 2016) .
141 . Anthony Lacey, McCarthy Says “More to Come” After Historic $24.7 Billion 
VW Emissions Deal, 27 Clean Air Rep . (Inside EPA) 13:11 (June 30, 2016); 
Patrick Ambrosio, Civil, Criminal Charges Still Possible After $14.7 Billion 
Volkswagen Diesel Settlement, 47 Env’t Rep . (BNA) 1975 (July 1, 2016) .
142 . Carolyn Whetzel, California Rejects Volkswagen’s Recall Plan for 3-Liter 
Diesels in Emissions Scandal, 47 Env’t Rep . (BNA) 2141 (July 15, 2016) .
On October 25, 2016, U .S . District Court Judge Charles 
Breyer approved the Volkswagen settlement of up to $10 
billion to compensate consumers, $2 .7 billion for environ-
mental mitigation measures, and $2 billion to promote 
ZEVs .143 Owners of approximately 475,000 Volkswagens 
and Audis with two-liter engines can choose to have Volk-
swagen buy back their vehicles for the trade-in price on 
September 15, 2015, or have the vehicle repaired .144 Volk-
swagen will also pay up to $332 .5 million in attorney fees 
and costs as well as $1 .2 billion to its 652 U .S . dealers .145
In December 2016, a new agreement was proposed that 
would require the three-liter diesels to be brought into 
compliance or be bought back by Volkswagen, and the 
company would pay another $225 million into the pollu-
tion-reduction trust fund .146 On December 20, 2016, Volk-
swagen reached a $1 billion settlement involving about 
83,000 MY 2009-2016 Audi, Volkswagen, and Porsche 
vehicles with three-liter diesel engines .147 It appears that the 
three-liter diesel vehicles can be fixed, which will avoid the 
costs of a buyback program .148
On September 9, 2016, a former Volkswagen engi-
neer, James Liang, pleaded guilty to conspiring to defraud 
the United States and violate the CAA, which was the 
first criminal case to develop from Volkswagen’s cheat-
ing .149 He is cooperating with prosecutors .150 On Febru-
ary 23, 2017, a Volkswagen engineer, Oliver Schmidt, was 
arrested while on vacation in Florida and charged with 
fraud and conspiracy .151 He pleaded guilty on August 11, 
2017, in the federal District Court for the Eastern District 
of Michigan, and sentencing is scheduled for December 6, 
2017 .152 Other Volkswagen employees have been indicted, 
but they are in Germany and are protected from extra-
dition .153 On April 21, 2017, Volkswagen agreed to pay a 
143 . There is a separate agreement with California that involves Volkswagen 
spending $800 million over 10 years to help build the state’s zero-emission 
infrastructure and support the electric vehicle market . As of July 2017, the 
details of the agreement were still being negotiated . See Carolyn Whetzel, 
VW Revamps Zero-Emissions Vehicle Plan to Woo California, Daily Env’t Rep . 
(BNA) (July 3, 2017) .
144 . Sudhin Thanawala & Tom Krisher, Judge Approves $15 Billion VW Emissions-
Cheating Settlement, Salt Lake Trib ., Oct . 26, 2016, at A3 .
145 . Kartikay Mehrotra, VW, Dealers Propose $1.2 Billion Agreement for Losses 
From Emissions-Cheating Scandal, 47 Env’t Rep . (BNA) 2865 (Oct . 7, 
2016) .
146 . David LaRoss, EPA Reaches New Pact With Volkswagen, Class Settlement 
Likely, 27 Clean Air Rep . (Inside EPA) 26:8 (Dec . 29 . 2016) .
147 . Kartikay Mehrotra, VW Reaches Deal for Emissions-Cheating Audi, Porsche 
Models, Law Energy & Climate Rep . (BNA) (Dec . 21, 2016) .
148 . LaRoss, supra note 146 .
149 . Tom Schoenberg et al ., Veteran Volkswagen Engineer Is First Charged in U.S. 
Diesel Emissions Probe, 47 Env’t Rep . (BNA) 2687 (Sept . 16, 2016) .
150 . Jamie Butters et al ., Volkswagen Pleads Guilty in U.S. Emissions-Cheating 
Scandal, Law Energy & Climate Rep . (BNA) (Mar . 10, 2017) .
151 . Margaret Cronin Fisk & Keith Naughton, VW Executive Pleads Not Guilty 
as 5 Avoid U.S. Diesel Case, Law Energy & Climate Rep . (BNA) (Feb . 23, 
2017) .
152 . Margaret Cronin Fisk & Brian Louis, VW Executive Schmidt Pleads Guilty in 
Auto Emissions Scandal, Env’t Rep . (BNA) (Aug . 11, 2017) .
153 . Id . Giovanni Pamio, an Italian living in Germany, was the eighth person 
charged by DOJ . He is not a German citizen, which means he could 
be subject to extradition, but he was arrested in Germany, which takes 
precedence over the U .S . charges . Karin Matussek & Christoph Rauwald, 
Ex-Audi Manager Charged in U.S. Over VW Emissions Scandal, Daily Env’t 
Rep . (BNA) (July 10, 2017) .
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criminal fine of $2 .8 billion and civil penalties of $1 .5 bil-
lion for misleading U .S . regulators and customers .154 On 
May 19, 2017, EPA approved Volkswagen’s fix for 84,391 
MY 2012-2014 Passat sedans with two-liter diesel engines 
and automatic transmissions .155
However, as of July 2017, no criminal indictments of 
any senior Volkswagen executives have been announced, 
although the DOJ investigation continues . Volkswagen’s 
chief executive officer, Martin Winterkorn, is also under 
investigation in Germany .156 Criminal penalties imposed 
against corporate executives have an important role to play 
when the management is willing to risk the organizations’ 
assets in order to make a profit . Moreover, criminal penal-
ties are unmatched for their deterrent effect, and a single 
successful criminal prosecution may result in improved 
compliance by an entire industry .157 Nevertheless, no senior 
executive in the automotive industry has ever been crimi-
nally prosecuted for tampering violations of the CAA .
C. Enforcement Against Corporations 
and Individuals
After decades of actions by the automotive companies to 
cheat on emissions requirements, EPA and DOJ appeared 
to be moving to a more-aggressive enforcement position . 
On September 9, 2015, DOJ released its memorandum 
“Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdo-
ing” over the signature of Deputy Attorney General Sally 
Quillian Yates .158 The Yates Memo reflected a policy shift 
to strengthen the efforts to pursue individual corporate 
wrongdoers based on six key steps . They are as follows:
(1) in order to qualify for any cooperation credit, corpora-
tions must provide to the Department all relevant facts 
relating to the individuals responsible for the misconduct; 
(2)  criminal and civil corporate investigations should 
focus on individuals from the inception of the investiga-
tion; (3) criminal and civil attorneys handling corporate 
investigations should be in routine communication with 
one another; (4)  absent extraordinary circumstances or 
approved departmental policy, the Department will not 
release culpable individuals from civil or criminal liability 
when resolving a matter with the corporation; (5) Depart-
ment attorneys should not resolve matters with a corpora-
tion without a clear plan to resolve related individual cases, 
and should memorialize any declinations as to individuals 
in such cases; and (6) civil attorneys should consistently 
focus on individuals as well as the company and evalu-
154 . Margaret Cronin Fisk & Tom Schoenberg, VW’s $4.3 Billion U.S. Deal 
Completed With Court’s Approval, Law Energy & Climate Rep . (BNA) (Apr . 
21, 2017) .
155 . Ryan Beene, U.S. Regulators Approve Emissions Fix for Volkswagen Diesels, 
Law Energy & Climate Rep . (BNA) (May 19, 2017) .
156 . Fisk & Naughton, supra note 151 .
157 . See generally Arnold W . Reitze Jr ., Air Pollution Control and 
Climate Change Mitigation Law 308-10, 318-19 (2d . ed 2010) .
158 . Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney General, DOJ 
(Sept . 9, 2015) (Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing), 
available at https://www .justice .gov/dag/file/769036/download .
ate whether to bring suit against an individual based on 
considerations beyond that individual’s ability to pay .159
The Yates Memo may have signaled a more-aggressive 
posture by DOJ toward individuals violating the CAA . 
However, it is not clear if this aggressiveness applies to 
senior executives . After the release of the Yates Memo, EPA 
brought an enforcement action against the Harley-David-
son Motor Co . for selling more than 324,000 parts (“super 
tuners”) designed to defeat the emission control on highway 
motorcycles .160 On August 18, 2016, the case was settled 
with a consent decree that requires the defendants to pay a 
civil penalty of $12 million, spend $3 million to reduce air 
pollution, and comply, in the future, with CAA require-
ments to include obtaining a valid COC before introduc-
ing into commerce a new motorcycle .161 In July 2017, DOJ 
dropped the $3 million penalty based on a new policy of 
U .S . Attorney General Jeff Sessions, but this action will 
require a revised consent decree to be approved by a federal 
judge .162 This exercise of prosecutorial discretion stands in 
contrast to the penalties, discussed below, that have been 
imposed on mechanics working as I/M inspectors .
In May 2017, DOJ announced it planned to sue Fiat 
Chrysler Automobiles NV for installing illegal defeat 
devices, which carries a potential penalty of $4 .6 billion .163 
On May 23, 2017, the United States brought a civil action 
in the U .S . District Court for the Eastern District of Mich-
igan against FCA US LLC, Fiat Chrysler Automobiles NV, 
VM Motori S .p .A ., and VM North America, Inc .164 The 
action seeks injunctive relief and civil penalties for violat-
ing CAA §§204 and 205 and the related regulations .165 The 
defendants allegedly sold approximately 103,828 MY 2014-
2016 diesel-fueled new motor vehicles under the Ram 1500 
and Jeep Grand Cherokee model names . The defendants 
allegedly used at least eight software-based features called 
auxiliary emission control devices (AECDs) that were not 
included in the disclosures made as part of the COC appli-
cations . The defendants allegedly installed AECDs that 
caused the emission control system to underperform or 
shut off unless the vehicle was operating within the param-
eters of the federal emission tests . The use of these AECDs 
resulted in the vehicles emitting substantially higher levels 
of NOx during normal driving conditions than during fed-
eral emission tests .
A new motor vehicle containing an AECD that was 
not disclosed results in the vehicle not being covered by 
the COC, which means it is prohibited from being sold 
in the United States .166 Moreover, no new vehicle may be 
159 . Id .
160 . United States v . Harley-Davidson, Inc ., No . 16-1687 (D .D .C . Aug . 18, 
2016) .
161 . Id .
162 . David Shepardson, U.S. Justice Department Drops $3 Million Harley-
Davidson Emissions Penalty, Reuters, July 20, 2017 .
163 . Ryan Beene et al ., U.S. Said to Ready Lawsuit Over Fiat Chrysler Diesel 
Emissions, Env’t Rep . (BNA) (May 19, 2017) .
164 . United States v . FCA US LLC et al ., No . 2:17-cv-11633-JCO-EAS (E .D . 
Mich . May 23, 2017) .
165 . 42 U .S .C . §§7523, 7524; 40 C .F .R . pt . 86 (2017) .
166 . CAA §203(a)(1), 42 U .S .C . §7522(a)(1) .
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equipped with a defeat device, as defined at 40 C .F .R . 
§86 .1803-01 . In addition, the CAA makes it illegal to 
remove emission control devices or to use any device 
intended to bypass, defeat, or render inoperative any 
device used to control emissions .167
Pursuant to CAA §203(a)(1) and (a)(3)(A), violations are 
subject to penalties of up to $37,500 per motor vehicle for 
violations prior to November 3, 2015, and $45,268 for each 
violation occurring on or after that date . The violation of 
§203(a)(3)(B), involving the sale or installation of defeat 
devices, provides for penalties that are 10% of the penalties 
of §203(a)(1) and (a)(3)(A) .168
It is apparent that the I/M program has not played more 
than a minor role in assuring compliance by the automo-
tive industry with the CAA’s emission control require-
ments . The automotive industry’s cheating has been too 
sophisticated for the states to control through their I/M 
programs . Thus, the I/M program is focused on its third 
role, which is to prevent tampering and assure that vehicles 
in the hands of consumers continue to control emissions in 
a manner consistent with the manufacturer’s COC .
For many years, the I/M program was based on tail-
pipe tests . These tests were relatively easy to thwart and 
enforcement actions were rare . With the development of 
more-sophisticated motor vehicle technology and the use 
of OBD-based testing, it became more difficult to cheat 
on the tests and it became easier to successfully bring 
enforcement actions against violators . However, although 
the CAA is a complex and comprehensive statute, Con-
gress did not provide strong criminal sanctions for violat-
ing I/M provisions .
Title II of the CAA provides only civil penalties for tam-
pering with motor vehicle emissions controls . I/M is pri-
marily the responsibility of the states, with EPA regulations 
requiring specified processes to be instituted by the states 
and approved by EPA . Most states provide civil penalties 
and/or misdemeanor penalties for I/M violations .169 DOJ 
has increased its enforcement efforts since about 2009 by 
bringing actions based on the more general and ambiguous 
provisions of the federal criminal code found in Title 18 
of the U .S . Code, which provides more-stringent penal-
ties . Some of the statutes that potentially may be applied 
include crimes against the United States (18 U .S .C . §2); 
a false claim (18 U .S .C . §287); conspiracy to commit 
offense or to defraud the United States (18 U .S .C . §371); 
false statements made to the U .S . government (18 U .S .C . 
§1001); mail fraud (18 U .S .C . §1341); fraud by wire, radio, 
or television (18 U .S .C . §1343); and obstruction of justice 
(18 U .S .C . §§1503, 1505, 1510, 1512-1514, and 1517-1519) . 
Under 18 U .S .C . §1503, the government does not have 
to prove actual obstruction of justice, only the intent to 
obstruct justice .170
167 . CAA §203(a)(3)(A) & (B), 42 U .S .C . §7522(a)(3)(A) & (B) .
168 . 42 U .S .C . §7522(a) .
169 . See, e.g., La . Rev . Stat . §32:1312, Civil Penalties; Salt Lake County Health 
Department, Health Regulation #22, app . B .
170 . See United States v . Aguilar, 515 U .S . 593, 599 (1995) .
The Yates Memo makes it clear that a corporation 
seeking credit for cooperation when penalties are being 
negotiated must identify all individuals involved in or 
responsible for the misconduct, regardless of their status 
or seniority .171 As discussed below, nearly all the I/M crim-
inal enforcement actions brought by DOJ have involved 
prosecutions of low-level criminals who are almost always 
emissions inspectors .
On June 29, 2011, three inspectors at an emissions 
inspection station in Georgia were sentenced for issuing 
more than 1,400 fraudulent emissions certificates in viola-
tion of Georgia’s law, for which they received payment well 
in excess of the going rate for an emissions test .172 One of 
the defendants was sentenced to two years of incarceration, 
followed by one year of supervised release, because of his 
prior criminal history . A second defendant was sentenced 
to 180 days of home confinement, as part of a two-year 
term of probation, and 50 hours of community service . A 
third defendant was sentenced to 120 hours of home con-
finement as part of a two-year term of probation .173
On April 9, 2012, a licensed North Carolina emissions 
inspector, of Durham, North Carolina, pleaded guilty to 
conspiring to violate the CAA and to making false state-
ments .174 He used a surrogate vehicle (“clean scanning”) 
rather than the customers’ vehicles, which would have 
failed the emissions inspection, in order to falsely pass 
353 vehicles .175
In 2012, five defendants in Charlotte, North Carolina, 
were sentenced for using a device to bypass the OBD sys-
tem and provide false information that allowed the vehicles 
to pass an I/M test .176 The defendants were subject to pro-
bation and/or home detention, and/or community service 
and fines, but two defendants received prison sentences of 
60 days and five months .177 One of the defendants used an 
illegally purchased OBD II simulator to falsify emissions 
in violation of North Carolina’s vehicle emissions program 
for which he was sentenced to 24 months’ probation, which 
included six months of home detention, and was ordered to 
perform 150 hours of community service .178
On October 19, 2012, two defendants were sentenced 
for conducting false vehicle inspections at two repair shops 
in Charlotte, North Carolina .179 One of the defendants, 
a licensed inspector, conducted 236 false vehicle inspec-
tions using a surrogate vehicle to produce false passing 
results, for which he was fined $7,500, given three months 
in prison followed by three months of home confinement, 
and ordered to serve 50 hours of community service .180 The 
171 . Steven A . Lauer, Corporate Officers Take Note: Justice Department Is Telling 
U.S. Attorneys to Aim High, 47 Env’t Rep . (BNA) 869 (Mar . 18, 2016) .
172 . DOJ, Environmental Crimes Section Monthly Bulletin 22 (Aug . 2011) .
173 . Id .
174 . U .S . EPA, Environmental Crimes Bulletin 6 (Apr . 2012) .
175 . Id .
176 . U .S . EPA, Environmental Crimes Bulletin 9 (Oct . 2012); DOJ, Environmental 
Crimes Section Monthly Bulletin 11 (Aug . 2011) .
177 . Id .
178 . Id .
179 . U .S . EPA, Environmental Crimes Bulletin 8 (Oct . 2012) .
180 . Id .
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other defendant was a licensed inspector and the owner-
operator of a repair facility who used surrogate vehicles 
to falsely pass cars that would otherwise have failed the 
emissions inspection, for which he was paid .181 He was sen-
tenced to four months in prison to be followed by four 
months of home confinement, and he was ordered to serve 
50 hours of community service .182
Because these defendants participated in providing false 
certification of the emissions inspection requirements, 
they are guilty of violating CAA §113(c)(2)(A) . Some of 
these defendants used equipment to provide false data 
that allowed the vehicles to pass inspection . There is no 
indication that any person who supplied the equipment 
to improperly pass vehicles that would otherwise fail was 
prosecuted . Such a person would appear not to be covered 
by §113(c)(2)(A), which is why the government would seek 
to use Title 18 .
The government rarely brings criminal actions against 
executives of large corporations for violations of envi-
ronmental laws . The CAA provides criminal, civil, and 
administrative penalties for violation of its provisions in 
§113 .183 It does not explain when the various enforcement 
options should be used . In theory, any violation that meets 
the minimal mental state required for a knowing violation 
could lead to civil or criminal prosecution, or both . The use 
of the CAA’s criminal provisions is largely dependent on 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion .
The exercise of the power to bring a criminal action 
should be based on (1) the significance of the adverse envi-
ronmental impact or the extent of harm to the public’s 
health; (2) the deceptiveness of the conduct; (3) the extent 
to which the defendant flouted the law; and (4) the repeti-
tiveness of the violations or other aggravating factors .184 
Criminal prosecution should not be used for technical 
violations of complex environmental laws, but intentional 
harmful actions by corporate executives should result in 
their criminal prosecution . However, criminal prosecution 
of individuals for violation of the CAA’s emission control 
requirements appears more random than principled .
IV. The I/M Program in Utah
A. Overview
Although the pollution from individual mobile sources has 
declined, mobile source emissions are a leading cause of 
air pollution .185 The steady increase in the number of miles 
traveled nullifies some of the benefits of reduced vehicle 
emissions per mile that are driven by EPA’s emissions 
requirements for new motor vehicles .186
181 . Id .
182 . Id .
183 . 42 U .S .C . §7413 .
184 . David Uhlmann, Prosecutorial Discretion and Environmental Crime, 45 ELR 
10801 (Aug . 2015) .
185 . See generally Arnold W . Reitze Jr ., Mobile Source Air Pollution Control, 6 
Envtl . Law . 309 (2000) .
186 . Id .
In Utah, on-road sources are responsible for 36% of 
the statewide CO emissions, 33% of the NOx, 8% of the 
particulate matter smaller than 10 micrometers (PM10), 
17% of the particulate matter smaller than 2 .5 microm-
eters (PM2 .5), 1% of the sulfur oxide (SOx), and 3% of the 
VOCs .187 Because much of the motor vehicle use is con-
centrated in the areas of the state that are designated as 
nonattainment, the percentage of the pollutants contrib-
uted in those areas by motor vehicles should be expected 
to be much higher . The impact of pollutant emissions on 
ambient air quality is exacerbated by the topography of 
the state, which helps create the atmospheric conditions 
that result in poor air quality, especially during the win-
ter months .188
The I/M program is applicable to nonattainment areas 
that are not in compliance with the CAA for pollutants 
related to automotive emissions .189 In Utah, the PM2 .5 non-
attainment areas of primary concern are located along the 
Wasatch Front from Ogden to Salt Lake City to Provo, but 
part of Cache County is also a nonattainment area that 
extends into Franklin County, Idaho .190 On April 28, 2017, 
EPA classified the Provo and Salt Lake City metropolitan 
areas as well as Davis and Weber Counties and parts of 
Box Elder and Toole Counties as serious PM2 .5 nonattain-
ment areas, which will require a modified SIP be submitted 
to EPA .191 Salt Lake and Utah Counties are also nonat-
tainment for PM10 .
192 Salt Lake County and East Tooele 
County above 5,400 feet are nonattainment for sulfur 
dioxide (SO2) .
193
If a nonattainment area achieves compliance with 
NAAQS, it must develop and implement a 10-year main-
tenance plan that must be approved by EPA .194 In 1997, 
pursuant to CAA §107(d)(3)(E), EPA designated Salt 
Lake and Davis Counties as having attained the O3 stan-
dard, and it approved a maintenance plan, but that status 
may soon be changed to nonattainment .195 Davis County, 
Salt Lake County, and portions of Duchesne, Tooele, 
Uintah, Utah, and Weber Counties failed to meet the 
187 . Utah Division of Air Quality, 2015 Annual Report 23-25 (2016) . 
VOCs from motor vehicles are an important source of anthropogenic 
emissions, but in Utah, biogenic sources release 74% of the VOCs . Id . at 25 .
188 . Arnold W . Reitze Jr ., Utah’s Fine Particulate Air Pollution Control Program, 
2014 Utah L . Rev . Online 113 (2014), available at https://papers .ssrn .
com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth .cfm?per_id=361683 .
189 . CAA §§181(a)(2)(B), (b)(4), (c)(3), 187(a)(4) & (6), 42 U .S .C . §§7511a(a)
(2)(B), (b)(4), (c)(3), 7512a(4) & (6) .
190 . Utah Division of Air Quality, supra note 187 . Part of Cache, Box 
Elder, Weber, Tooele, and all of Davis, Salt Lake, and Utah Counties are 
nonattainment for PM2 .5 .
191 . Emma Penrod, EPA: Unmet Air-Pollution Standards Now “Serious,” Salt 
Lake Trib ., May 3, 2017, at B1; Emma Penrod, Utah Air Quality Failures to 
Get “Serious” Status, Salt Lake Trib ., Dec . 17, 2016, at A1 .
192 . Id .
193 . Utah Division of Air Quality, supra note 187, at 6 .
194 . CAA §175A, 42 U .S .C . §7505a .
195 . Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; State of 
Utah; Salt Lake and Davis Counties Ozone Redesignation to Attainment, 
Designation of Areas for Air Quality Planning Purposes, Approval of Related 
Elements, Approval of Partial NOx RACT Exemption, and Approval of 
Weber County I/M Program, 62 Fed . Reg . 38213 (July 17, 1997) . See also 
62 Fed . Reg . 28396 (May 23, 1997) . But see Emma Penrod, Utah’s 2017 
Resolution: A Plan for Cleaner Air, Salt Lake Trib ., Jan . 16, 2017, at A1 .
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more stringent 2015 O3 NAAQS .
196 Utah’s Department 
of Environmental Quality (DEQ) proposed designating 
three nonattainment areas for O3 .
197 The Wasatch Front 
has also had problems with CO emissions that led to I/M 
program requirements .198
The I/M provisions are found in the Utah SIP, §X, 
Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance Program .199 Part A 
includes the general requirements; Part B covers Davis 
County; Part C covers Salt Lake County; Part D covers 
Utah County; Part E covers Weber County; and Part F 
applies to Cache County .200 However, Utah delegates 
implementation to the health department of nonattain-
ment counties, as discussed below .201 The I/M program is 
designed to meet the CAA’s specific requirements appli-
cable to nonattainment areas, but it is also utilized as a 
control measure to attain and maintain the particulate 
NAAQS for PM2 .5 and PM10 in Cache, Davis, Salt Lake, 
Utah, and Weber Counties .202
In 2015, EPA approved amendments to Utah’s SIP 
that modified the general requirements of Utah’s I/M 
program and approved the addition of §X, Part F to add 
an I/M program for Cache County .203 The I/M program 
is countywide, although only part of the county is nonat-
tainment for PM2 .5 . The I/M program in Cache County 
is not mandated by the CAA, but has been adopted by 
Utah as part of its attainment demonstration for Cache 
County in order to reduce PM2 .5 precursor emissions of 
NOx and VOCs .
204
There is a separate I/M program for diesel-powered 
vehicles . On July 12, 1995, the Utah Air Quality Board 
adopted a diesel I/M program .205 Appendix 2 of §XXI is 
applicable to Davis County; Appendix 3 is applicable to 
Salt Lake County; and Appendix 4 applies to Utah Coun-
196 . Emma Penrod, Ozone: Utah Seeks Fed’s Help, Salt Lake Trib ., Oct . 18, 
2016, at A1 .
197 . Id . See also Penrod, Utah Air Quality Failures to Get “Serious” Status, 
supra note 191, at A4 . The nonattainment areas are Western Utah 
County; Salt Lake and Davis Counties, the western portion of Weber 
County, and the more populated area of Toole County; and parts of 
Duchesne and Uintah Counties .
198 . Salt Lake City has been redesignated as being in attainment for the CO 
standard and became CO maintenance areas . In 2005, EPA approved a 
revised CO maintenance plan and a revised I/M program for Salt Lake City . 
Provo was redesignated as attainment in 2005, and the I/M program for 
Utah County was approved . Ogden, which was redesignated as attainment 
for CO in 2001, had its maintenance plan revised on Sept . 14, 2005, in an 
EPA approval that also included the approval of the revised I/M program for 
Weber County . Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation 
Plans; State of Utah; Ogden City Revised Carbon Monoxide Maintenance 
Plan and Approval of Related Revisions, 70 Fed . Reg . 54267 (Sept . 14, 
2005) .
199 . Utah Admin . Code R307-110-31 (2016), Vehicle Inspection and 
Maintenance Program .
200 . Id .
201 . See, e.g., Salt Lake County Health Department, Health Regulation #22a, 
Vehicle Inspection/Maintenance .
202 . Utah SIP, §X, Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance Program (adopted by 
the Utah Air Quality Board Dec . 5, 2012) .
203 . Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; State of 
Utah; Motor Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance and Associated Revisions, 
80 Fed . Reg . 54237 (Sept . 9, 2015) .
204 . Id .
205 . Utah SIP, §XXI, Diesel Inspection and Maintenance Program (July 12, 
1995) .
ty .206 Utah County, however, ended its diesel I/M program 
in 2006 .207 This program was developed to control PM10 
emissions . Heavy-duty and light-duty diesel vehicles must 
meet opacity standards specified in Appendix 5 of SIP 
§XXI . Light-duty diesel vehicles must meet cutpoints, or 
allowable emissions, designed to achieve a 10% reduction 
in diesel particulates .208 Violations may result in a penalty 
of $299 per violation pursuant to Utah Administrative 
Code Rule R307-4 .209
Each of the counties has implementing ordinances . 
There are data that indicate that diesel vehicles fail I/M 
inspections more often than gasoline-powered vehicles . 
Salt Lake County fails about 6% of the diesel vehicles; 
about one-half the failures are because the emissions sys-
tems have been deliberately disabled .210 In Morgan and 
Weber Counties about 4 .5% of the gasoline vehicles fail, 
but 15% percent of the diesel vehicles fail, with about 40% 
of the failed vehicles showing evidence of tampering .211 
In Weber County, however, the diesel I/M program only 
began on January 1, 2017, and there is one waiver for any 
vehicle failing the test in 2017 or 2018 .212
B. Implementation of I/M in Utah
Utah’s I/M programs are health-based programs that are 
administered by local health departments .213 Counties with 
I/M programs may use standardized computerized I/M 
testing equipment, adopt standardized emission standards, 
and provide for reciprocity .214 Utah’s basic I/M program is 
based on EPA’s amended I/M regulations .215 Since 2002, 
OBD checks and OBD-related repairs are required as a 
routine component of Utah I/M programs on MY 1996 
and newer LDVs and LDTs equipped with certified OBD 
systems .216 The federal performance standard requires 
repair of malfunctions or system deterioration identified 
by or affecting OBD systems .217
Utah’s I/M programs are funded through several 
mechanisms including, but not limited to, a fee collected 
at the time of registration by the Utah Tax Commission 
Division of Motor Vehicles or the county assessor’s office, 
which is remitted to the county in which the vehicle is 
206 . Id .
207 . Emma Penrod, Emissions Testing That Targets Utah County Is Near Passage, 
Salt Lake Trib ., Mar . 3, 2017, at A5 .
208 . Utah SIP, supra note 205, §XXI.
209 . Id .
210 . Penrod, supra note 207 .
211 . Id .
212 . Weber Morgan Health Department, Weber County I/M Bulletin (Nov . 7, 
2016), available at http://www .webermorganhealth .org/environmental-
health/pdf/IM%20Bulletin%20diesel .pdf .
213 . The authority is found at Utah Code §41-6a-1642 (2017) . Davis and 
Salt Lake Counties started their I/M programs in 1984, followed by Utah 
County in 1986, and Weber County in 1990 . 62 Fed . Reg . 38213-02 (July 
17, 1997) .
214 . Utah Code §41-6a-1643 (2005) .
215 . Amendments to Vehicle Inspection Maintenance Program Requirements 
Incorporating the Onboard Diagnostic Check, 66 Fed . Reg . 18156 (Apr . 5, 
2001) .
216 . CAA §202(m)(3), 42 U .S .C . §7521(m)(3) .
217 . Id .
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registered .218 The collection of fees for various permit-
ting activities and the selling of inspection certificates to 
inspection stations are the other funding mechanisms .219
In 1994, the legislature provided that counties are to 
give preference to decentralized testing facilities and to use 
the most cost-effective means to achieve and maintain the 
maximum benefit with regard to air quality standards and 
to meet federal air quality requirements related to motor 
vehicles .220 This has resulted in Utah having only decen-
tralized test-and-repair facilities .
In 2002, Utah’s statute was amended to allow for 
inspections every other year for vehicles that are six years 
old or newer on January 1 each year .221 Therefore, vehicles 
less than two years old on January 1 of any year are exempt 
from an I/M inspection . In 2005, the legislature allowed 
counties with an I/M program to require college students 
and employees who park a motor vehicle on a college or 
university campus that is not registered in a county subject 
to emission inspection to provide proof of compliance with 
an emission inspection .222 Only Cache County requires 
compliance by college students .223
C. Salt Lake County’s Program
As previously discussed, Utah’s air pollution control pro-
gram is based on a revised SIP that includes a vehicle 
inspection program in its §X . The section has subdivisions 
applicable to the counties subject to an I/M requirement .224 
County health departments have promulgated additional 
I/M regulations because implementation of the I/M pro-
gram has been delegated to the counties . The I/M program 
is therefore a mix of federal, state, and local law . The Salt 
Lake County Health Department’s regulation #22, Vehi-
cle Emissions Control Program, is authorized by the Utah 
Code and is typical of the approach used in other counties 
in Utah .225
Salt Lake County implements the I/M program using 
more than 400 vehicle inspection stations .226 The county’s 
regulation applies to owners of motor vehicles in Salt Lake 
County; publicly owned vehicles operated in the county; 
owners, operators, and managers of I/M stations; and 
I/M inspectors and suppliers of analyzer equipment and 
gas calibrations .227 Analyzers include the OBD scanner .228 
Gaseous or liquid petroleum-powered vehicles of MY 1968 
or newer; light- and medium-duty diesel-powered vehicles 
218 . 62 Fed . Reg . 38213-02 (July 17, 1997) . Utah Code §41-6a-1642(10) 
(2016) .
219 . 62 Fed . Reg . 38213-02 (July 17, 1997) .
220 . Utah Code §41-6a-1642(2)(c) (2016) .
221 . Id . at §41-6a-1642(6)(b) (2002) .
222 . Id . §41-6a-1642(5) (2005) .
223 . Bear River Health Department, Regulation No . 2013-1, §6 .3 .
224 . See supra note 202-03 and accompanying text .
225 . Utah Code §26A-1-114 (2016) .
226 . Applus Automotive, Success Stories: Salt Lake & Weber County Utah 
Vehicle-Emissions Testing Programmes, http://www .applusautomotive .com/
en/successStory/Salt_Lake_&_Weber_County_Utah_vehicle-emissions_
testing_programmes-1340209435611 (last visited Aug . 3, 2017) .
227 . Salt Lake County Health Department, Health Regulation #22, §1 .1 .
228 . Id . §2 .4 .
of MY 1998 and newer; and specified heavy-duty diesel-
powered vehicles are required to pass an I/M inspection .229 
Vehicles six years and older must be inspected annually; 
newer vehicles are inspected every other year .230
The inspection measures the emissions of HC and CO 
based on a two-speed idle test (TSI), opacity and/or an 
OBD II test, as well as a visual inspection of the emission 
control systems .231 The cutpoints are based on the weight, 
class, and MY of the vehicle and are found in Appendix 
C of the regulation .232 TSI inspections are required for 
MY 1968-1995 light-duty, non-diesel vehicles and for MY 
1968 and newer medium-duty and heavy-duty non-diesel 
vehicles .233 Non-diesel vehicles of MY 1996 and newer and 
MY 1998 and newer light-duty and medium-duty diesel 
vehicles are subject to OBD inspections and a visual tam-
pering inspection .234 There are separate I/M provisions for 
heavy-duty diesel vehicles that are applicable only in Salt 
Lake County .235
If a vehicle fails an I/M inspection and the failure cannot 
be repaired for a specified cost ($450 for 1996 and newer 
non-diesel vehicles), it may be eligible for a waiver .236 Vio-
lators of the I/M regulation are subject to criminal, civil, 
and administrative enforcement actions .237 Most I/M viola-
tions are a Class B misdemeanor pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §26A-a-123 .238 A penalty schedule is found in 
the regulation’s Appendix B .239
In Salt Lake County, I/M inspections increased from 
437,888 in 2006 to 686,672 in 2015, with 532,526 per-
formed in the first nine months of 2016 .240 The I/M inspec-
tions are based on testing the OBD system for newer cars 
while older vehicles without an OBD system are subject to 
a TSI test .241 As new vehicles replace old vehicles, the per-
centage of tests based on the OBD system increases, and in 
2015, 87 .26% of the tests only involved OBD testing . The 
failure rate for the I/M test was 4 .6% in 2015 and 4 .11% in 
the first nine months of 2016 .242
Assuming the average cost of an I/M test for vehicle 
owners is $25, the cost to Salt Lake County vehicle owners 
in 2015 was $17,166,800 . Since 31,609 vehicles failed the 
test, simple arithmetic demonstrates the cost for each vehi-
cle that fails the I/M test is more than $543 . If we assume 
it takes an hour to have a vehicle tested and the driver’s 
time is worth $15 an hour, the additional cost to Salt Lake 
County residents in 2015 was $10,299,780 (686,652 mul-
229 . Id . §4 .1 .8 . Certain vehicles are exempted by §4 .1 .7 .
230 . Utah Code §41-6-163(6) (2016) .
231 . Salt Lake County Health Department, Health Regulation #22, §§2 .36, 
2 .58 . OBD is defined at §2 .47 .
232 . Id . §§2 .17, 4 .1 .4 .
233 . Id . app . A §3 .2 .3 .
234 . Id . app . A §3 .2 .3(3) .
235 . Id . app . D .
236 . Id . §4 .4 .
237 . Id . §7 .
238 . Id . §8 .1 .
239 . Id . app . D .
240 . Data supplied to the author by Ed C . Jensen, an air pollution control 
specialist with the Salt Lake County Health Department, Sept . 23, 2016 .
241 . Salt Lake County Health Department, Health Regulation #22, §2 .36 .
242 . See supra note 240 .
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tiplied by $15) . The total cost is more than $27 million, 
or about $869 per vehicle failed . This does not include the 
cost of repairing failed vehicles, but that information is 
unavailable . It also does not include the cost of administer-
ing and enforcing the I/M program . Is the program worth 
the cost?
V. Evaluating the I/M Program
One of the issues surrounding the I/M program in Utah, 
and throughout the country, is the inability to calculate 
the effectiveness of the I/M programs . As this Article has 
demonstrated, the I/M program has had minimal effec-
tiveness in detecting and/or dealing with the failures of 
manufacturers to build vehicles that continue to meet 
federal emission requirements . The value of this program 
therefore depends on its ability to reduce emissions from 
in-use vehicles .
In the early days of the I/M program, it was easier to esti-
mate the tons of pollutants reduced because emissions were 
measured during the I/M test . After OBD became nearly 
universally installed in U .S . vehicles, emissions generally are 
not tested, and even if they are, it is unlikely that they would 
be excessive compared to vehicles manufactured in the past . 
Moreover, in states similar to Utah, where only five coun-
ties have I/M programs, some residents may register their 
vehicles in a county that does not require an I/M inspection .
In 1997, when EPA approved Utah’s I/M program, it 
had to make a judgment that the program would help the 
state meet its CAA obligations .243 This could have included 
a quantification of the expected benefits, but it did not . The 
legal requirements for Utah’s SIP included an emissions 
inventory that showed total emissions were less than or 
equal to the 1994 emissions . Thus, the emissions for point 
sources, area sources, on-road mobile sources with I/M 
programs in place, and nonroad sources were aggregated . 
Emissions without I/M were not calculated, which means 
the reduction benefits of I/M could not be determined, but 
Utah did model on-road benefits of enhanced I/M over 
basic I/M .244
Although there have been many updates to the I/M 
program, there has not been any new quantification of the 
emissions reductions attributable to the program . How-
ever, in 2015, Utah’s Division of Air Quality used EPA’s 
243 . Proposed Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Improvement Plans; 
State of Utah; Salt Lake and Davis Counties Ozone Redesignation to 
Attainment, Designation of Areas for Air Quality Planning Purposes, 
Proposed Approval of Related Elements, Proposal Approval of Partial NOx, 
RACT Exemption, and Proposed Approval of Weber County I/M Program, 
62 Fed . Reg . 28396 (May 23, 1997) .
244 . Letter from Timothy Russ, Environmental Scientist, EPA Region 8, to the 
author (Nov . 9, 2016) . More details can be found at Proposed Approval 
and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; State of Utah; Salt 
Lake and Davis Counties Ozone Redesignation to Attainment, Designation 
of Areas for Air Quality Planning Purposes, Proposed Approval of Related 
Elements, Proposed Approval of Partial NOx RACT Exemption and 
Approval of Weber County I/M Program, 62 Fed . Reg . 28396 (May 23, 
1997) . The proposal showed reductions in VOC emissions in tons per day 
from 75 .40 in 1994 to 56 .47 in 2007 and reductions in NOx from 73 .66 to 
67 .31 . These reductions assumed the use of I/M . Id . at 28405 .
approved on-road emissions model, MOVES2014a, to 
estimate the emissions reduction from on-road vehicles .245 
It estimated that the I/M program resulted in emissions 
reductions in Salt Lake County of 9,354 tons per year 
(tpy) for CO, 851 tpy for NOx, and 653 tpy for VOCs .
246 
Because the pollutants of interest to the state are primarily 
NOx and VOCs, the cost of the I/M program divided by 
the reductions in these pollutants results in a crude cost 
estimate of nearly $18,000 per ton .247 The cost is higher if 
we include the cost of repairing the failed vehicles, but that 
information is unavailable . Additional costs are incurred to 
administer and enforce the I/M program .
For comparison, EPA’s 2016 Cross-State Air Pollution 
Update for the 2008 Ozone NAAQS determined that the 
estimated marginal cost of $1,400 per ton for the control 
of electric power-generated NOx is a cost-effective control 
strategy .248 In its 2013 PM2 .5 SIP, the Utah DEQ estimated 
the costs to reduce 2017 emissions in the Salt Lake area by 
43 .1 tons per day .249 Area source controls were expected to 
cost between $238 and $6,560 per ton of reduction .250 On 
May 23, 2017, Utah’s Division of Air Quality proposed 
new VOC controls for eight area sources encaged in coat-
ing operations as part of its upcoming serious PM2 .5 SIP 
revision . The staff analysis found the cost of removing a ton 
of VOC ranged from $1,878 to $3,658, with an average 
cost of $2,596 .251 Point sources are required to install con-
trols at a cost of $1,357 to $23,319 per ton of reduction .252 
As an example of the high costs of compliance, when the 
Holly refinery upgraded its facility in 2013, it estimated 
the cost per ton of emissions from its flare gas recovery 
system at $141,082 .07 per ton for NOx and $151,494 .03 
per ton of VOC reduction .253
Thus, I/M costs, although significantly higher than 
most area source controls, when compared to other station-
ary source compliance costs, are not the only sources to 
have high costs imposed . After a half-century of effort to 
control air emissions, additional emissions reductions are 
often costly . However, the benefits of the I/M program are 
not well-documented .
The cost per ton of emissions reduction due to I/M pro-
grams can be quantified, but the effort involves making 
assumptions that will affect the result . However, because 
the emissions reductions from I/M are largely unknown, 
benefits are difficult to quantify . I/M may help force the 
245 . Letter from Richard McKeague III, Transportation Planner/Air Quality 
Modeler, Utah Division of Air Quality, to the author (Oct . 31, 2016) .
246 . Id .
247 . Id .
248 . 81 Fed . Reg . 74504, 74508 (Oct . 26, 2016) .
249 . Information Sheet, Utah DEQ Division of Air Quality, PM2 .5 State 
Implementation Plan (SIP): Salt Lake and Provo SIPs (Sept . 2013) .
250 . Id .
251 . Memorandum to the Air Quality Board (May 23, 2017) (on file 
with author) .
252 . Information Sheet, Utah DEQ, supra note 249 .
253 . Letter from Holly Refinery & Marketing Co .-Woods Cross LLC, to 
Bryce Bird, Director, Utah DEQ Division of Air Quality (Mar . 21, 
2013) (Revised Netting Analysis for the Heavy Crude (Black Wax) 
Processing Change to the Modernization Project), available at https://
deq .utah .gov/businesses/H/hollyrefinery/crudeproject/docs/2013/jun 
2013/SupplementalNOIs32113to43013 .pdf .
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public to confront the impact their vehicles have on mobile 
source air pollution, which is the major source of air pol-
lutants in most nonattainment areas . To the extent this 
motivates behavior, the I/M program may result in bet-
ter maintenance of vehicles, but this possible benefit is not 
quantifiable . The nature of the OBD check is to detect 
vehicle malfunctions early and have them remedied, thus 
preventing emissions, but this also is not easily quantified . 
In addition, drivers may voluntarily seek repairs prior to an 
I/M inspection if their vehicle’s MIL indicates emissions 
problems, which can result in emissions reductions long 
before a vehicle is scheduled for I/M .
Even if state or local governments conclude that the 
benefits of I/M do not exceed the costs, to avoid having an 
I/M program may be difficult because the CAA requires 
it in areas with serious air pollution problems . Moreover, 
even if the CAA does not require I/M, the states, including 
Utah, may voluntarily choose to adopt an I/M program in 
order to obtain emission reduction credit that is needed 
to demonstrate reasonable progress toward meeting ambi-
ent air quality targets . The I/M requirements represent a 
policy that is based on the conditions of the 1970s, when 
cheating was rampant and tampering was easy . Today, 
emission control technology is far more sophisticated and 
tampering is more difficult . At this time, there is little cur-
rent information to either support or reject the efficacy of 
the I/M program .
Environmental law is becoming more focused on the 
cost of regulations . On June 29, 2015, the U .S . Supreme 
Court held that EPA “must consider cost—including, 
most importantly, cost of compliance—before deciding 
whether regulation is appropriate and necessary .”254 The 
case involved the mercury and air toxic standards that 
were being imposed on the power industry .255 The Court 
held that EPA erred when it failed to consider the costs 
of the regulation in making its initial determination that 
the rule was appropriate and necessary . After remand, the 
D .C . Circuit sent the rule back to EPA, and the Agency 
decided the rule was necessary and appropriate even when 
costs were taken into consideration .256 While the case can 
be distinguished from the I/M program, it does indicate 
that EPA should seriously consider costs and must con-
sider them early in the regulatory process . It could be 
useful to take a fresh look at the costs and benefits of 
the I/M program . Such knowledge could result in a more 
effective program .
254 . Michigan v . Environmental Prot . Agency, 135 S . Ct . 2699, 45 ELR 20124 
(2015) .
255 . Patrick Ambrosio, Alternative Compliance Rule for Mercury, Air Toxics 
Challenged by Utility Industry, 46 Env’t Rep . (BNA) 561 (Feb . 27, 2015); 
Stuart Parker, Utilities Say EPA Violated Air Law in Revisions to MACT’s 
SSM Provisions, 26 Clean Air Rep . (Inside EPA) 5:25 (Feb . 26, 2015) .
256 . Stuart Parker, High Court Denies Utility MACT Suit but Further Appeal 
Remains Possible, 27 Clean Air Rep . (Inside EPA) 12:3 (June 16, 2016) .
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